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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce entered in the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
on July 3, 1989 by the Honorable Leonard H. Russon.

The Utah

Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL
1.

Whether the Court abused its discretion in awarding the

defendant alimony in the amount of $1,100.00 per month.
2.

Whether the Court abused its discretion in awarding the

defendant alimony until age 65 in light of the short duration of
the marriage and the fact that the plaintiff paid to the
defendant the sum total of $34,500.00 as temporary alimony during
the two-year period prior to trial.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989).

30-3-5.

Disposition of property -- Maintenance and health care
of parties and children — Court to have continuing
jurisdiction — Custody and visitation -- Termination
of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered,
the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, and
parties.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In supplement to and correction of Mrs. Rudman's statement
of the case, Mr. Rudman would submit the following:

The trial court did award Mrs. Rudman temporary alimony in
the amount of $1,500.00 per month on September 29, 1987,
commencing in August 1987.

Inasmuch as the order does not

specify the date on which the alimony was due, the payments were
due one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th of each month
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.5 (1989).

Although Mrs.

Rudman did ask the court on three occasions to find Mr. Rudman in
contempt for his failure to pay alimony, the issue of contempt
was repeatedly continued until it was ultimately to be heard at
trial.

However, at trial, Mrs. Rudman did not present evidence

of the contempt, and there was no finding of contempt.
The first order to show cause was filed by Mrs. Rudman on
October 15, 1987, only 16 days after the court entered its
temporary order.

(R. 109)

By the time Mr. Rudman filed his

answer on November 2, all sums had been paid.

(R. 125)

Mrs. Rudman!s second motion was dated April 26, 1988, but it
was filed on May 5, seeking payment for the month of April.
156-57)

(R.

The matter was heard on May 9, (R. 161) wherein Mr.

Rudman was ordered to pay temporary support for April and May by
May 31, 1988.

(R. 187)

until further hearing.

The issue of contempt was continued
(R. 18 7)

The amounts were paid as

required, and defendant filed a satisfaction of judgment on June
15, 1988.

(R. 198)

Mrs. Rudmanfs third motion in re contempt was filed the very
next day on June 16, 1988 (R. 196), seeking payment for that same
month of June.

The issue of contempt on the third motion was
2

continued a number of times (R. 206-207) and was ultimately
continued until trial.

(R. 212)

Similar to the motions in re contempt, the motions to compel
discovery were never heard by the court.
The remainder of Mrs. Rudman's statement of the case is
accurate.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Rudman submits the following facts in supplement to or
correction of Mrs. Rudman's Statement of Facts.
Mrs. Rudman testified that, prior to the parties1 marriage,
they had numerous conversations wherein she expressed her concern
that the alimony she received from her first divorce would
terminate upon her remarriage.

Mr. Rudman denies they ever had

such discussions and denies that Mrs. Rudman expressed concern
over her alleged inability to adequately support herself if this
marriage should fail.

(Tr. Vol. 3, pg. 29)

Instead, the parties

discussed and decided that, since they each had their own
sufficient premarital cash and property, should the marriage fail
they would each go their own separate ways.

(Tr. Vol. 3, pg 30)

Therefore, the parties entered into a pre-nuptial agreement at
Mrs. Rudman's suggestion, and it was her attorney who drafted the
agreement.

(Tr. Vol. 2, pg. 16)

Despite Mrs. Rudman's

allegations that she entered into the pre-nuptial agreement to
protect herself from Mr. Rudman's children, Mr. Rudman testified
that the agreement was designed to allow each of them to maintain

3

as separate the property brought into the marriage. (Tr. Vol. 3,
pg. 29-30)
It is true that the pre-nuptial agreement only specifically
lists one asset, the condominium on Elizabeth Street.

(R. 33)

However, this asset was included in the agreement to provide Mrs.
Rudman a limited life estate in the event Mr. Rudman died during
the marriage.

(R. 34)

Prior to execution of the pre-nuptial agreement on April 15,
1981, Mrs. Rudman was aware that her first husband had filed a
motion to terminate her alimony in January of that year.

Due to

her upcoming marriage to Mr. Rudman, no final disposition was
rendered or necessary on this motion. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg 115)
Despite the fact that Mrs. Rudman had

no formal education

or training, she had demonstrated prior to and during the
marriage the ability to profitably establish and operate small
businesses.

Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Rudman established and

operated a telephone answering service which she sold for
$80,000.00.

(Tr. Vol. 4, pg 58)

In addition, during the

marriage she purchased and operated a Diet Center and a
housecleaning business.

She paid $38,000.00 for the Diet Center

in 1983, and in 1988, she sold the Diet Center for $50,000.00.
(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 7-10 and pg. 113)

After the parties separated,

Mrs. Rudman purchased the Merry Maids housecleaning business and
invested a total sum by her own accounting of $48,186.58.
(Defendant's Ex. 96)

4

Both the Diet Center and Merry Maids were purchased by Mrs.
Rudman with her own, personal funds, and the purchases were made
without the prior knowledge of Mr. Rudman. (Tr. Vol. 3, pg.
13-14)
Although Mrs. Rudman testified that she drew no salary from
either business, and that Merry Maids only showed a nominal
profit in 1988 and 1989, she also testified on cross-examination,
that some checks written on the Merry Maids accounts were used to
pay her personal expenses.

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 77-85)

Gross sales

for Merry Maids for March 1987, through September 1988, not
including the month of July 1987 totalled $194,784.76. (Tr. Vol.
5, pg. 75)
Despite Mrs. Rudman's contention that she had to deplete her
assets because Mr. Rudman did not give her any money during the
marriage for her personal or household expenses, Mr. Rudman paid
most household expenses and marital obligations as well as giving
her money for her personal use.

(Tr. Vol 3, pg. 10)

Further, in

the face of Mrs. Rudman's contention that she did not have
sufficient money to pay expenses after the parties1 separation,
she chose to expend significant sums of money to purchase and
remodel a house on Sumac Drive in Logan, Utah.

She purchased the

home for $72,000.00, with a $36,000.00 cash down payment.

To the

date of trial, she had invested approximately $65,000.00 in cash
for remodeling and repair costs.

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 21-22)

This

home in Logan was in addition to the apartment she rented in Salt
Lake City.

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 22)
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Although Mrs. Rudman testified that she assisted Mr. Rudman
in the operation of the theater businesses, Mr. Rudman repeatedly
denied that Mrs. Rudman had any involvement in his businesses
whatsoever.

Specifically, Mr. Rudman testified that Mrs. Rudman

had never been involved in the operation of Westates (Tr. Vol. 1,
pg. 50); that she had never contributed any time, labor or
materials to the Rawlins Theatre (Tr. Vol. 2, pg. 53); that she
did not contribute to the Davis property purchase (Tr. Vol. 2,
pg. 63); that Mrs. Rudman had never made any contribution of
money, time, labor or materials to the Logan Theaters (Tr. Vol.
2, pg. 69); that she had never worked in any of his theaters,
taking tickets, cleaning or had any other participation (Vol. 2,
pg. 178); and Mrs. Rudman did not contribute in any way
whatsoever towards the purchase of the St. George lot. (Tr. Vol.
3, pg. 179)
Also contrary to Mrs. Rudman1s assertion that she assisted
in the construction and furnishing of the Scofield cabin, Mr.
Rudman testified that this cabin had been substantially completed
by the fall of 1980, over six months prior to their marriage.
(Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 37)
1979.

He also testified that he used the cabin in

(Tr. Vol. 2, pg. 34)

Duane Slaugh, Mr. Rudmanfs insurance

agent, testified that the cabin had been completed in 1978 and
had been insured since that time.

(Tr. Vol. 2, pg. 155)

Other

witnesses testified as to completing work on the cabin prior to
the parties' marriage, including but not limited to plumbing,
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fireplace installation and carpentry.

(Trs. Vol, 2, pg. 165;

Vol. 3, pg. 17; and Vol. 3, pg. 63)
Although Mrs. Rudman testified at trial that she suffered
from back problems resulting from being thrown from a horse, no
medical testimony was offered or introduced at trial; and this
testimony was disputed by Mr. Rudman.

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 224)

Despite Mrs. Rudmanfs claim that she suffers from certain other
health problems, there was no evidence that these problems would
in any way interfere with her ability to conduct her businesses
and to earn an income.
The evidence at trial established that Mrs. Rudman had
monthly living expenses in the amount of $2,853.23 which amount
included the mortgage payment on the Logan home and the rent
payment on the Salt Lake City apartment.
No. 102)

(Defendant's Exhibit

In addition, although Mrs. Rudman submitted an exhibit

which indicated that her only source of income was the temporary
alimony of $1,500.00 per month, the evidence also established
that deposits into her personal checking account averaged
$2,858.01 per month.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 113)

Mr. Rudman's

average monthly net income after deductions for federal and state
income taxes and FICA was $2,184.89.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2)

Mr. Rudman's monthly expenses totalled $3,058.45.

(Plaintiff's

Exhibits Nos. 3 and 38)
From the time Mr. Rudman was ordered to pay temporary
alimony of $1,500.00 per month commencing in August of 1987
through the time of the entry of the decree of divorce in July of
7

1989, Mr. Rudman paid to Mrs. Rudman temporary support in the
amount of $34,500.00.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 54)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

The trial court abused its discretion in awarding Mrs.

Rudman alimony in the amount of $1,100.00 per month until she
reaches the age of 65 in light of her failure to establish
financial need and in light of her ability to earn sufficient
income to meet her own needs.

Further, this was a second

marriage for both parties, and each retained as separate property
substantial assets brought into the marriage, including income
producing assets.

At the date of trial, Mrs. Rudman had already

received temporary alimony in the amount of $34,500.00, and the
Court's order will result in seven years of alimony to Mrs.
Rudman on a six-year marriage.
2.

In order for Mrs. Rudman to prevail on her argument that

the trial court abused its discretion in making its determination
of which assets were marital and the value of those assets, the
evidence must clearly preponderate against the findings.

Because

the findings at issue are amply supported by the evidence, Mrs.
Rudman's argument on appeal must fail, and the trial court's
property division should be affirmed in all respects.
3. The trial court correctly ordered each party to pay his
and her own attorney's fees incurred in light of Mrs. Rudman's
failure to establish financial need and the fact that many of her
fees incurred were unreasonable because they were incurred as a
result of her emotional demands to bring unnecessary and
8

frivolous pretrial motions, many of which were never heard by the
court.
ARGUMENT
I
IN RESPONSE AND ON CROSS APPEAL, THE TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE AMOUNT AND
DURATION OF ALIMONY AWARDED
On appeal, Mrs. Rudman argues that the trial court abused
its discretion in awarding her insufficient alimony and for an
insufficient period of time.

On cross appeal, Mr. Rudman argues

that the trial court abused its discretion in that the amount of
alimony and its duration are excessive.
The well established factors for a court to consider in
determining an appropriate award of alimony have been correctly
set forth by appellant in her brief.

These factors include the

consideration of the financial needs of the receiving spouse,
that spouse's ability to provide for her own needs, and the
paying spouse's ability to pay.

(See Munns v. Munns,,790 P.2d

116 (Utah App. 1990)).
Mrs. Rudman argues that there are insufficient findings of
fact to indicate that the trial court analyzed these factors in
making its award of alimony.

Instead, the findings are adequate

in light of the fact that there was sufficient evidence before
the trial court to make a proper determination of alimony.
Further, although the trial court did not expressly enumerate all
of the required factors, the court's consideration of those
factors is implicit in the findings.
9

Therefore, any lack of a

specific finding is not fatal on appeal.

As this Court stated in

Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987):
This Court concurs in the Supreme Court's
reflection that more detailed findings on
each required factor would assist in the
appellate process. However, we find as did
the Supreme Court in Paffel, that !the
evidence in this case supports the lower
court's order and appellant has made no
showing to rebut the presumption that the
trial court did consider respondent's income,
expenses, and need for support.'
Id. at 671-72. (quoting Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 at 102
(Utah 1986)) .
Applying these principals to the case at bar, there are two
findings of fact which directly address the issue of alimony.
The first of these, as Mrs. Rudman points out, is Finding of Fact
No. 13.

In its entirety, it states:
The Court finds that prior to this marriage,
the Defendant was receiving $1,100 per month
as alimony from a prior marriage. The Court
finds that Defendant [sic] was fearful of
losing this alimony by remarriage and
expressed her concern to the Plaintiff and
the necessity that this marriage be
permanent. The Court finds that the
Defendant lost this alimony by virtue of her
marriage to the Plaintiff and that it is
reasonable and just that temporary alimony be
paid to her until she reaches the age of
Social Security retirement, age 65.

(R. 380).
The second finding which addresses the alimony factors is Finding
of Fact No. 23.
her brief.

Mrs. Rudman failed to address this finding in

It states:

The Court finds that the Defendant was
employed as an insurance agent and
10

subsequently was self-employed in owning an
answering service, which she sold in 1976 for
$80,000.00. The Court finds that during her
first marriage, she was employed, and that
during this marriage, she has operated two
separate businesses and is presently
self-employed in the third. The Court find
[sic] that the Defendant resides in Salt Lake
City, but has purchased a second home in
Logan, which she visits periodically. The
Court finds Defendant is a very pleasant and
dignified-appearing woman, and based upon her
history, there is no reason why she should
not continue to work. The Court finds she
has the means to provide for her own
reasonable attorney fees and costs in this
matter.
(R. 385).
In addition, Finding of Fact No. 14 deals with the issues
implicit in the decision to award alimony as it addresses the
fact that each party helped support themselves during the course
of this marriage.

Finding of Fact No. 14 states as follows:

The Court finds that both parties contributed
to living expenses during the marriage, with
Defendant paying for food and miscellaneous
household expenses from his funds. The Court
finds that both parties seemed content to
share these expenses from their own funds,
that it appeared Plaintiff paid a greater
share of said expenses, but that the evidence
was inconclusive, and the Court finds that
neither party gained an advantage over the
other in this regard.
(R. 380-81).
There was ample evidence to support these Findings.

To

begin with, despite the fact that Mrs. Rudman had no formal
education or training, she had demonstrated prior to and during
the marriage the ability to profitably establish and operate
small businesses.

As outlined in Finding of Fact No. 23, Mrs.
11

Rudman was self-employed in owning an answering service, which
she had sold for $80,000.00.

(R. 385)

In addition, during the marriage she had purchased and
operated a Diet Center and a housecleaning business known as
Merry Maids.

She paid $38,000.00 for the Diet Center in 1982,

and in 1988 she sold it for $50,000.00.

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 8-9)

After the parties separated, Mrs. Rudman purchased the Merry
Maids housecleaning business and invested, by her own accounting,
a sum of $48,186.58.

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 43-44, 52) This business

was purchased with her own funds (Tr. Vol. 5, pg 74), and
purchased during a time when she is now claiming she had no money
for living expenses other than the temporary alimony being paid
by Mr. Rudman.
Although Mrs. Rudman testified that she drew no salary from
either business and that Merry Maids only showed a nominal profit
in 1988 and 1989, she also testified on cross examination that
some checks written on the Merry Maids account were used to pay
her personal expenses.

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg 77-85)

In addition,

gross sales from Merry Maids from March 1987 through September
1988, the first year of operation of the business, totalled over
$194,784.76.

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 75)

Finding of Fact No. 23

expressly finds that Mrs. Rudman was self-employed in this
business, and the evidence is clear that the business is an asset
from which Mrs. Rudman can meet her own financial needs.
385)

12

(R.

Mrs. Rudman presented evidence at trial that her living
expenses totalled $2,853.23 (Defendants Exhibit 102), but that
her only income was temporary alimony in the amount of $1,500.00
per month.

(Defendant's Exhibit 101)

Despite this disparity,

Mrs. Rudman expended significant sums of money during the
parties' separation to purchase and remodel a house on Sumac
Drive in Logan, Utah.

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 21-22)

She purchased the

home for $72,000.00 with a $36,000.00 cash down payment.

To date

of trial she had invested an additional $65,000.00 in cash for
remodeling and repair costs.

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg 21-22)

Further,

this home in Logan was in addition to the apartment she
maintained in Salt Lake City, which she testified was her primary
residence.

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 22)

In fact, from the time of

filing of the complaint to the date of trial, Mrs. Rudman spent a
total of $159,186.58 for the purchase and remodeling of the Sumac
home, purchase of the Merry Maids business, and the purchase of a
Jeep.
Mr. Rudman's average monthly net income after deductions for
federal and state income taxes and FICA was $2,184.89.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2)

His monthly expenses totalled $3,058.45.

(Plaintiff's Exhibits 3 and 38)
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding Mrs. Rudman alimony in the amount of
$1,100.00 per month.

Clearly, Mrs. Rudman has the ability to

support herself and meet her own financial needs.

13

It was also an abuse of discretion to award Mrs. Rudman
alimony until she reaches the age of 65.
Rudman was 60 years old. (R. 378)

At time of trial, Mrs.

The parties were married on

April 17, 1981, and the complaint in this matter was filed in
April of 1987.
marriage.

(R. 2-8)

This was, therefore, a six-year

From the time Mr. Rudman was ordered to pay temporary

alimony in the amount of $1,500.00 per month effective August of
1987, (R. 117-118) to time of entry of the decree of divorce, Mr.
Rudman paid Mrs. Rudman temporary support in the amount of
$34,500.00 over a two-year period.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 54)

From and after entry of the decree in July of 1989, Mr. Rudman
has been ordered to pay Mrs. Rudman the amount of $1,100.00 a
month in alimony. (R. 392-396)

This results in an additional

five-years of alimony, for a total of seven years of alimony on a
six-year marriage.

Based on the evidence, these awards were an

abuse of discretion.
Although the trial court found that it was equitable and
just to restore Mrs. Rudman to the position she was in prior to
her second marriage, that position was questionable at best.

Her

first husband had filed a motion to terminate alimony which was
pending at the time of her marriage to Mr. Rudman.

The marriage

to Mr. Rudman made the motion to terminate moot, and no
disposition was made.

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 114)

The Court of Appeals was faced with a similar situation in
the Boyle case, supra.

In that case, Mr. and Mrs. Boyle were

married when they were 6 3 and 5 6 years of age respectively.
14

Both

had been married before, and their marriage lasted only about 7
years.

In that case, similar to this case, Mrs. Boyle had owned

a home and had substantial premarital assets.
Court upheld the trial court's refusal to award

In Boyle, this
alimony to Mrs.

Boyle in part because "[s]he had received several months of
temporary support to give her an opportunity to rehabilitate."
Id. at 67 2.
of $34,500 —

In this case, Mrs. Rudman received temporary support
clearly enough to rehabilitate.

Based on the evidence then, Mrs. Rudman is not entitled to
alimony in the amount of $1,100.00 per month until she reaches
the age of 65.

She did not satisfy her burden to establish need,

and the evidence did establish her ability to provide for
herself.

Inasmuch as Mrs. Rudman is self-employed, there is no

requirement that she retire at age 65.

Given the length of the

marriage and the duration and amount of temporary support
awarded, Mrs. Rudman had received ample alimony up to the time of
trial and no further alimony award should have been entered.
Instead, the evidence before this Court in the record is
sufficient for this Court to enter its order immediately
terminating Mrs. Rudman's alimony.
II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN ITS CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
OR ITS DETERMINATION OF THE VALUE OF THAT
. PROPERTY
Mrs. Rudmanfs argument with regard to the characterization
and value of marital property is merely an argument that her

15

evidence was better than Mr. Rudman's evidence.

Instead, the

trial court considered the evidence of both parties, including
the expert testimony offered by each, and made a decision based
upon its evaluation of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses.
This Court can only reverse findings of fact if the evidence
clearly preponderates against them.

This principal of law was

outlined in Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981).
Jensen, the Supreme Court of Utah stated as follows:
This is a suit in equity. Since appeal may
be had on the facts as well as the law in
equity cases, it is our duty, when called
upon, to weigh the facts as well as review
the law.
Although this Court's statements of the
standard of review of Findings of Fact in
equity cases have varied considerably, it is
most commonly said that we reverse only when
the evidence clearly preponderates against
the findings of the trial court. This
principle is well stated in the plurality
opinion in Nokes v. Continental Mining and
Milling Co., 6 Utah 2d at 178-179, 308 P.2d
954:
'The finding of the trial court will not be
disturbed if the evidence preponderates in
favor of the finding; nor, if the evidence
thereon is evenly balanced or it -is doubtful
where the preponderance lies; nor, even if
its weight is slightly against the finding of
the trial court, but it will be overturned
and another finding made only if the evidence
clearly preponderates against his finding.1
In substance, this is the same standard
applied in those cases which state that we
reverse only when the trial court's finding
is against the pure weight of evidence.

16

In

In applying this standard, we are 'mindful of
the advantaged position of the trial judge
who sees and hears the witnesses' and
therefore, 'give due deference to his
decisions, ' . . .
Id. at 151-52.

(citations omitted).

To specifically address each of Mrs. Rudman's claims, the
trial court's decision is supported by extensive and specific
findings of fact.

The first of these is Finding of Fact No. 15,

wherein the court stated:
The Court finds that the Plaintiff owned
considerable properties at the time of the
marriage to Defendant and that there was no
co-mingling of Mr. Rudman's assets of [sic]
those of the Defendant. Plaintiff's assets
were maintained as a separate entity,
including those where expansion, remodeling,
or improvements had been made to that
premarital property. The Court finds that
Defendant did not contribute labor or assets
toward any of these properties and that it is
reasonable and just that the Plaintiff have
and maintain his properties, including
improvements and increases in values thereof.
(R. 381).

The court's following Finding, No. 16, enumerated the
plaintiff's premarital properties.

This Finding states as

follows:
The Court finds that the Plaintiff [sic]
premarital properties are as follows:
a. Condominium at 2560 Elizabeth
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, acquired May 2,
1980.
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e. (Plaintiff's one-half interest
in the Westates partnership, commenced
approximately 30 years ago, which includes
rentals of movie screens and/or theaters in
Soda Springs, Mt. Home, Rupert, Preston,
Burley, Caldwell and Pocatello, Idaho; Elko
and Ely, Nevada; movie screens in Davis(Layton), known as CinemaCorp, acquired in
1970, Logan, known as Cache Amusement, Inc.,
including the Redwood, Capital and Cinema I
theaters; Monticello, Mt. Pleasant,
Roosevelt, Ephraim, 6 screens in St. George,
including the Cinema's I, II and III; the
Gaiety, the Dixie, and the Starlight; Jackson
and Lyman, Wyoming, and West Yellowstone,
Montana.
f. The Plaintiff's one-half
interest in the St. George condominium
acquired with James Nicolodemus on November
13, 1972.
g. Plaintiff's 80% ownership in
T.T.&S. Corporation, organized in 1980, which
included the assets that came from the Rock
Theater Company, including, Montpelier,
Evanston, and Rawlins Theater screens, the
latter of which was sold in 1982.
h. Plaintiff's interest in the
Trolley Theaters, Trolley North, Trolley
Corners, and Trolco, acquired in the
mid-1960's, and the sale proceeds from
Plaintiff's Trolley Square interests
negotiated in 1984, and paid in full in
January, 1988.

j. Plaintiff's premarital bank
accounts, including, but not limited to those
associated with all of the business entities
referred to above.
(R. 381-383).
The court also specifically addressed the property of the
parties which was newly acquired and therefore marital property.
That Finding, No. 19, states:
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The Court finds that the newly acquired
property to be considered as marital property
in this marriage are the lease interest in
the St. George movie screens Cinema I, II,
and III, the added screens to the Logan
Cinemas designated as Cinema II and IIIf the
triangle piece of land added to the Davis
Drive-in's; the St. George Bloomington lot
#17; the Defendant's home at 1515 Sumac Dr.,
Logan, Utah; the Defendant's Merry Maid
business; the proceeds Defendant received
from the sale of her Diet Center business and
miscellaneous property.
(R. 383).
Finally the trial court made specific findings as to the
value of the marital property.

Finding of Fact No. 20 states as

follows:
20. The Court finds that the marital
property has the following values and/or
encumbrances:
a.

Plaintiff's one-half
leasehold interest in St.
George Cinemas I, II
and III
$19,000.00

b.

St. George Bloomington
Lot #17

$22,250.00

c.

Plaintiff's one-half
interest in the triangle
land for the Davis
Drive-in
$14,325.00

d.

Cinemas II and III
(additions to existing
Cinema I) valued at
$416,243.00 with construction costs of
$426,939.00 leaving a
negative balance of
-10,696.00. Plaintiff
has a one- half interest
therein
$-5,348.00
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-e.

1515 Sumac Dr.f Logan,
Utah-$107,500.00,
Defendant's down payment
of $32,500.00, mortgage
$40,000.00, remodeling
costs, $42,000.00leaving a negative
balance
$-7,000.00

f.

Defendant's Diet Center,
initial purchase-$38,000.00
and sold for $50,000.00,
Defendant's investment
of considerable amounts
therein, with
a net value of
$ 2,000.00

g.

Defendant's Merry Maid
business with equitable
value

$ 3,500.00

1500 shares Techno-Lab
stock

$

Plaintiff's Jeep
Wagoneer, value
$12,000.00, less lien
of $10,528.39

$ 1,471.61

50 shares of Prudential
Financial Service stock

$

h.
i.

j.
TOTAL

0.00

587.50

$ 63,134.11

In Mrs. Rudman's first claimed error, she argues that the
trial court abused its discretion in its determination of which
property was marital.

The first such item she addresses is loans

made during the marriage to various business entities.

Mrs.

Rudman seems to argue that, because Mr. Rudman made loans from
one of his premarital business entities during the course of the
marriage to another of his premarital business entities, those
loans somehow became a marital asset.

In other words, because

Mr. Rudman acted as a conduit for these funds, he did so in his
20

personal capacity; and therefore the funds were loaned by Mr. and
Mrs. Rudman.

One does not follow from the other unless and until

Mrs. Rudman can prove that the funds were co-mingled.

Even Mrs.

Rudman's expert, Merrill Norman, testified that he accepted Mr.
Rudman's position that the loaned monies came one-half from him
and one-half from his business partner in Westates, Mr.
Nicolodemas.

On cross-examination by Mr. Rudman's counsel, Mr.

Norman stated as follows:
Q. You don't have that readily before you
whether it was one year ago, five years ago?
A.

It was during the period of the marriage.

Q. Can you tell me the source of those
monies as they came to Westates, from whom
they came?
A. No. As I testified a few moments ago, I
accepted Mr. Rudman's answer that half came
from him and half came from his partner.
Q.

None of it came from Mrs. Rudman, did it?

A.. Well, when I say Mr. Rudman, I am not
excluding Mrs. Rudman. I don't know whether
they came from Mrs. Rudman or not.
(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 191-192).
Contrary to Mrs. Rudman's assertion in her brief that Mr.
Rudman presented no evidence as to the source of these funds, Mr.
Rudman testified extensively as to loans between his various
business entities.

Specifically, Mr. Rudman testified that the

loans came from cash flow from the other theaters.
pgs. 81-84)

(Tr. Vol. 3,

Therefore, Mrs. Rudman is claiming an interest in

funds which Mr. Rudman exercised control over in the course of
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conducting and managing his premarital businesses.

There is no

basis for her claim in law or fact, and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in failing to find that the loans were a
marital asset.
As to Mrs. Rudman's claim that the trial court failed to
adequately value her contributions to the Scofield cabin and the
Bloomington and Elizabeth Street condominiums, there was ample
testimony provided by Mr. Rudman contradicting the evidence Mrs.
Rudman argues on appeal.

To begin with, although the total value

of the Bloomington condominium was listed on Exhibit 117, there
was no evidence or testimony by Mrs. Rudman as to any
improvements specifically made by her.
As to her claim that she made improvements to the Scofield
cabin, the evidence was overwhelming that the cabin had been
completed prior to the parties1 marriage.

Mr. Rudman testified

that the cabin had been substantially completed by the fall of
1980, over six months prior to their marriage.
that he had used the cabin in 19 79.

He also testified

Duane Slaugh, Mr. Rudman's

insurance agent, testified that the cabin had been completed in
in 1978 and had been insured since that time.

Other witnesses

such as plumbers and other workmen testifed as to completed work
on the cabin prior to the parties' marriage.
165; Vol. 3, pg. 17; and Vol. 3, pg. 63)

(Trs. Vol. 2, pg.

The only improvements

made by Mrs. Rudman were for purchases of bed linens and drapes.
(Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 42-43 and Tr. Vol. 3, pg. 14)

Mr. Rudman also

testified that the cabin was furnished with furniture that he had
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removed from his Elizabeth Street condominium when Mrs. Rudman
insisted the parties remodel that condominium to suit her taste.
(Tr. Vol. 1, pg 43)
As to Mrs. Rudman's alleged improvements to and furnishing
of the Elizabeth Street condominium, it was her decision to
remodel the condominium because she did not like many of its
features.

(Tr. Vol. 2, pg. 21-22)

Contrary to her assertions,

Mr. Rudman paid for all of the expenses for that remodeling.
(Vol. 2, pg. 22)

Mrs. Rudman only purchased a coffee table, a

wall piece and a few other items, all of which she took with her
when she moved from the condominium.

(Tr. Vol. 2, pg. 181-182)

Again, the trial court was in the best position to judge the
credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, and the trial court's
findings are amply supported by the evidence presented at trial.
Likewise, with respect to the value of the Jeep, there was
quite simply conflicting evidence.

Mr. Rudman, the owner of the

Jeep, who knew its purchase price and optional equipment,
testified to a figure consistent with the trial court's findings.
(Tr. Vol. 3, pg. 35-37)

Mr. Norman's testimony was not supported

by any personal inspection of the vehicle or any independent
knowledge of its mileage and optional features.

Once again, the

trial court analyzed all evidence before it and made its finding
of fact, which finding is supported by credible evidence.
Therefore, Mrs. Rudman's claim that the trial court failed
to properly value the marital estate as to the loans receivable,
the value of the Jeep and the value of the improvements to real
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property is simply Mrs. Rudman1s attempt to have this Court
accept her evidence over the evidence of Mr. Rudman.

However,

that is not this Court's role unless the evidence clearly
preponderates against the findings.

Because each finding was

amply supported by evidence in the record, there can be no abuse
of discretion here.

Therefore the trial court's findings should

be affirmed.
Next, addressing Mrs. Rudman's allegations on appeal with
regard to the valuations of Cinemas I, II and III in St. George
and Cinemas II and III in Logan, Mrs. Rudman once again argues
that this Court should prefer her evidence over that of Mr.
Rudman.
Instead, it is clear that the trial court considered all
evidence presented to it on the issues of the value of the
cinemas.

In its memorandum decision, the trial court stated:
Both parties called expert witnesses
(certified public accountants). More often
than not expert witnesses give testimony
substantially different from each other. A
national financial publication recently
submitted a tax question to 50 CPA's across
the United States, and received 50 different
results, with differences in some instances
exceeding 60%. Experts can differ in theory
and application. The same experts can look
at the same facts, and come up with totally
different conclusions. This is a common
experience in trial courts. The case at bar
is no exception.
The determination to be made by this Court
will not turn on the intricies of theory or
application where nearly anything can be
justified by the same. It is the purpose of
this Court to do that which is fair, just and
equitable. It will look to the expert
24

testimony along with all other evidence and
make its decisions unto that end.
(R. 352-353).
This is exactly what the court did, and the findings made by
the trial court are amply supported by the evidence.
Mr. Rudman1s expert, Mr. Stephen Nicolatus, used the income
and asset approaches to determine the value of the leasehold
interest held by Mr. Rudman and his partner, Mr. Nicolodemus, in
the St. George cinemas.

(Tr. Vol. 4, pg. 12-18)

Because the

fair market value of the equipment which is leased for those
Cinemas is less than the amount which remains due and owing on
the lease, Mr. Nicolatus correctly concluded that, using the
asset approach, the leasehold had no value.
In applying the income approach, Mr. Nicolatus concluded
that the leasehold had a value of $76,000.00.
23)

(Tr. Vol. 4, pg.

Although Mrs. Rudman's expert, Mr. Norman, challenged Mr.

Nicolatus1 use of a 25% capitalization rate on the basis that it
was too high, this opinion was based upon Mr. Norman's
understanding that Mr. Rudman and his partner enjoyed a monopoly
in the theater business in St. George.

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 140-141)

However, Mr. Nicolatus testified that his use of that
capitalization rate was based on several considerations,
including discussions with John Price of Price Development and
the St. George Chamber of Commerce.

(Tr. Vol. 4, pg. 17)

From

these discussions he learned that ground had been broken on a
300,000 square foot mall in St. George which will include either
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a four-screen or six-screen theater.

(Tr. Vol. 4, pg. 17)

Therefore, the basis for Mr. Norman's use of a lower
capitalization rate was erroneous.
With regard to Mrs. Rudman's expert's position that the
figures for officer compensation from the St. George cinemas was
high, Mr. Norman also testified that the percentage of
compensation taken from St. George was in line with the
percentage of revenues generated by St. George.
197-198)

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg.

In other words, the St. George cinemas were assessed a

pro-rata share of the total officer compensation based upon the
total revenues generated for all of the theaters in which Mr.
Rudman had an interest.
Therefore, considering all evidence before it as to value,
including conflicting expert testimony, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that Mr. Rudman's one-half
interest in the St. George leasehold, using an average of the
income and asset approaches, was $19,000.00.

The evidence

presented by Mr. Norman at trial and argued by Mrs. Rudman on
appeal simply does not preponderate against this finding, and it
should therefore be affirmed.
As with the St. George cinemas, there was conflicting
evidence before the court as to the appropriate value of the
Cache theaters.

Mr. Norman's testimony, however, was based on

his erroneous interpretation of the trial court's ruling on the
pre-nuptial agreement executed by the parties.
183-188)
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(Tr. Vol. 5, pg.

In interpreting the pre-nuptial agreement between the
parties, the trial court correctly concluded that:
However, where prior marriage property is
merely rolled over into another asset, even
if done so after the marriage, such remains
the property of the original owner, and only
that amount in excess thereof constitutes
property accumulated after the marriage. In
other words, $10,000.00 in a savings account
prior to the marriage is not marital
property, regardless of its increase in value
during the marriage, but if that $10,000.00
is utilized to purchase some common stock
worth $10,000.00, while the value of the
stock of $10,000.00 is not marital property,
any increase in the value of that stock would
be. Any property acquired after the marriage
is marital, less that amount utilized for its
acquisition that can be traced to a point
prior to the marriage.
(R. 246).
In her appellate brief at pages 25 and 26, Mrs. Rudman
accurately points out the testimony of both Mr. Nicolatus and Mr.
Norman with regards to the value of the Cache theaters.

As

pointed out in the trial court's memorandum decision, experts
always disagree.

However, Mr. Norman's calculations were based

on Mrs. Rudman's theory that monies accumulated during the course
of the marriage in Mr. Rudman's pre-marital assets somehow became
marital monies to be divided at trial.

Essentially, Mr. Norman's

testimony at trial ignored Mr. Rudman's evidence that all monies
invested in the theaters came from pre-marital assets or
earnings.

Instead, Mr. Norman assumed and Mrs. Rudman argues on

appeal that there had been extensive co-mingling of those funds.
(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 186)

That assumption is erroneous and was never
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proven at trial.

Therefore, once again, the evidence does not

preponderate against the trial court's findings.

The finding of

the value of the Cache theaters was correct and should be upheld
on appeal.
Ill
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING EACH OF THE PARTIES TO PAY HIS OR
HER OWN FEES
The decision as to whether or not to award attorney fees and
costs lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.

As

the Utah Court of Appeals stated very recently in Morgan v.
Morgan, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (June 29, 1990):
The decision to award fees rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court, but must
be based on evidence of financial need and
reasonableness.
Id. at 37.
Therefore, in order for a party to recover his or her
attorney fees in a divorce action, that party must establish a
financial need and the reasonableness of the fees at issue.

(See

also Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990); Rasband v.
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 at 1336 (Utah App. 1988); and Asper v.
Asper, 753 P.2d 978 (Utah App. 1988)).
Applying this test to the case at bar, the defendant simply
failed to meet her burden.
financial need.

First, she failed to establish

To begin with, she was awarded her business,

Merry Maids, an income producing asset, which she had purchased
with her own funds during the parties1 separation.
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(R. 389)

She

was also awarded other assets, including the home on Sumac Drive
which the trial court found had equity of $67,500.00.

(R. 389)

Mrs. Rudman had purchased this home with a cash down payment of
$32,000.00; and from the time the parties filed their complaint
for divorce to the time of trial, Mrs. Rudman had invested over
$65,000.00 in cash into the home for remodeling and improvements.
Another major expenditure by Mrs. Rudman prior to trial was her
purchase of a Jeep for in excess of $10,000.00 in cash.
Vol. 5, pg. 69)

(Tr.

Notwithstanding making such expenditures while

at the same time incurring substantial attorney's fees, she
testified at trial that she did not have the money to pay her
attorney.

(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 62)

A party cannot deplete cash

reserves for the purpose of purchasing personal assets and then
expect their spouse to pay their exorbitant attorney's fees.

In

light of all of the evidence, it is clear that Mrs. Rudman did
not meet her burden of showing financial need.
Second, the court found that it was not necessary to address
the reasonableness of the attorney's fees because the court had
ordered each party to pay their own.

(R. 358)

The court did,

however, express concern as to the amount of fees incurred by
both parties.

(R. 358)

Although on appeal Mrs. Rudman argues

that it was an abuse of discretion not to award her attorney's
fees for the necessity of bringing motions in re contempt and
motions to compel discovery prior to trial, a review of the
record establishes the issue of contempt was never addressed.
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Not having done so, she has waived this issue and is barred from
arguing it on appeal.
However, a review of the circumstances surrounding the
motions in re contempt and motions to compel discovery
establishes that any fees incurred would have been unreasonable.
Each of the motions in re contempt were filed only days after
monies became due and days after documents were filed
establishing satisfaction of previous amounts due.

Of the three

motions in re contempt and the two motions to compel discovery,
only one was heard and resulted in an order.

That order granted

Mr. Rudman three weeks to cure a 60-day arrearage, and that
arrearage was immediately cured.

Mr. Rudman submits that these

motions were filed to harass him and to create a misperception
before the trial court regarding his performance under the orders
at issue. As a result, Mrs. Rudman is not entitled to fees for
those motions.
Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion to order each
party to pay their own attorney's fees, and the trial court's
order should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's findings of fact with respect to the
characterization of marital property and its determination of the
value of that property were amply supported by the evidence.
division of that property therefore should be affirmed.

The

Further,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering each of
the parties to pay their own attorney's fee.
30

The trial court's

award of alimony, however, was excessive.

Based upon the

evidence in the record and the findings of fact, this Court
should immediately terminate Mrs. Rudman's alimony.
Respectfully submitted this ^ r a day of July, 1990.
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